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An Analysis of Alternative
Emission Trading Strategies
of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol*
By Leo Schrattenholzer and Gerhard Totschnig**
Summary: This article analyzes the cost of Canada, Japan, and Western Europe of complying with
the Kyoto Protocol and the possible revenues of Eastern Europe, Russia, and Ukraine in a set of
scenarios, each of which reflecting one particular pattern of permit trading. One main focus was to
investigate how a working Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) scheme may influence the market
power of a possible cartel of “hot air” sellers. The results show that the compliance costs are signifi-
cantly reduced with the availability of CDM and that these cost depend only weakly on the restric-
tions of the “hot air” supply. The greenhouse gas emission reductions of the trading scenarios are
about 40% less than in a domestic measures only scenario. The analysis uses a modified version of
the well-known MERGE model (Manne and Richels, 2004).
Zusammenfassung: Dieser Artikel analysiert die Kosten, die Japan, Kanada und Westeuropa infolge
der Erfüllung ihrer Verpflichtungen gemäß dem Kyoto-Protokoll entstehen, sowie den möglichen
Ertrag, den Osteuropa, Russland und die Ukraine aus dem Verkauf eines Teils ihrer Emissionszertifi-
kate erlösen können. Für die Analyse werden verschiedene Szenarien angenommen, von denen jedes
ein bestimmtes Muster des Emissionshandels widerspiegelt. Im Besonderen wurde der Einfluss eines
funktionierenden CDM-Systems (Reduktionsgutschriften im Rahmen des „Clean Development
Mechanism“) auf die Marktdominanz eines möglichen solchen Kartells untersucht. Die Resultate zei-
gen, dass die Kosten der Erfüllung der Kyoto-Verpflichtungen stark abnehmen, wenn Reduktionsgut-
schriften im Rahmen des CDM verfügbar sind, und dass diese Kosten nur schwach von (Selbst-)
Beschränkungen der Anbieter abhängen. Die Treibhausgasemissionsreduktionen für die Emissions-
handelsszenarien sind etwa 40 % geringer als in einem Szenario ohne Emissionshandel. In der Ana-
lyse wird das weithin bekannte MERGE-Modell verwendet (Manne und Richels 2004).
1 Introduction
Russia keeps playing a key role in the Kyoto Protocol. After an intense discussion Russia
ratified the Kyoto Protocol on 18 November 2004, which subsequently entered into force
on 16 February 2005.
Now, after ratification, Russia’s expected surplus of emission allowances during the “Kyo-
to period” 2008–2012 will enable the country to influence the global carbon market by
controlling the amount of “hot air” offered to Parties of the Kyoto Protocol facing binding
greenhouse gas emission constraints. By holding back permits from the global market,
Russia can increase total income from carbon trading and keep the carbon price high.
*The authors are grateful to the Environment Division of Tokyo Electric Power Company for supporting major
parts of this study. Helpful suggestions and advice were received from Alan S. Manne, Ikuo Nishimura, Kensuke
Ohyama, Taishi Sugiyama, Koji Nagano and Jochen Diekmann.
** Environmentally Compatible Energy Strategies (ECS) Program, International Institute for Applied Systems
Analysis (IIASA), email: leo@iiasa.ac.at, totsch@iiasa.ac.at
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Russia’s market power will depend on geopolitical factors and on the effectiveness of the
Kyoto Protocol’s “flexibility mechanisms”, most importantly the Clean Development Me-
chanism (CDM). Especially interesting is if and how the Kyoto Protocol’s “flexibility me-
chanisms” can reduce the possible Russian market dominance. Perhaps the most important
political factor will be the rules governing the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol in
Europe. Outside Europe, Parties to the Kyoto Protocol are alert to the possibility of a “Eu-
ropean bubble” which – so it is feared – would give Europe a competitive advantage by
“absorbing” the excess carbon emissions in Eastern European EU member countries or ac-
cession countries.
To analyze the importance of each of these factors, we have used a modified version of the
MERGE model (Manne and Richels, 2004) to formulate carbon trade regimes that reflect
the main possibilities of the global market situations described above.
In Section 2 of this paper, we give a brief description of the MERGE model and its IIASA
extensions. In Section 3, we give a brief characterization of a long-term global reference
scenario in which we embed our analysis of the First Commitment Period (2008–2012),
followed by a presentation the results of analyzing five compliance scenarios, each of
them describing one particular carbon trading regime. In Section 4, we draw conclusions
from looking at all our scenarios together and compare them with results obtained by other
authors.
2 The MERGE Model
2.1 MERGE “in a Nutshell”
The global optimization model MERGE (Manne and Richels, 2004) describes the interac-
tion between macroeconomic production, the energy system (demand and supply), pol-
lutant emissions, and climate change. The model consists of three logical parts: a
macroeconomic module, an energy supply part, and a climate module. It combines a top-
down description of the economy and energy demand with a bottom-up description of the
energy sector.
The macroeconomic module defines an inter-temporal utility function of a single represen-
tative producer-consumer in each of the model’s world regions, which is then maximized
by MERGE subject to given constrains. The main variables of this module are the produc-
tion factors capital stock, available labor, and energy inputs, which together determine the
total output of an economy according to a nested CES (constant elasticity of substitution)
production function. The optimal quantities of the production factors are determined by
their relative prices. The core of the energy module is a comparatively simple Reference
Energy System (RES) describing the technological options available to supply the energy
needed as a production factor. The climate module calculates the resulting GHG concen-
trations and global temperature.
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MERGE was designed as an integrated-assessment model (IAM) to study global GHG
mitigation scenarios and to conduct cost-benefit analysis.1 For the given purpose of our
analysis, IIASA-ECS amended the original MERGE 5 model. They are described in the
following subsection.
2.2 IIASA Extensions of MERGE
In order to be able to model the important players in the Kyoto Protocol, the two MERGE
regions CANZ (Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) and EEFSU (Eastern Europe and
Former Soviet Union) were split into the four regions Canada, ANZ (Australia and New
Zealand), EEU (Eastern Europe) and FSU (Former Soviet Union). The model now includ-
es eleven world regions.2
Also, all six “Kyoto gases” are now included in the dynamics determining emission permit
trade in the First Commitment period, CH4 leakages from natural gas pipelines have been
included, and the limits on sequestration from forest management as given in the
Marrakech Accord were included.
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is one of the Kyoto Protocols “flexible
mechanisms”, designed to reduce the economic costs (and to thus increase the global ef-
ficiency) of greenhouse gas abatement. Equations describing the CDM mechanism and a
price-responsive CDM supply were incorporated into the model. As to quantities and
prices of CDM projects, we used an interpolation of two supply curves reported by Point
Carbon (Tangen et al. 2004). Our interpolation (“Ratification in 2005”) and the original
2003 and 2007 curves are shown as the middle curve in Figure 1.
As to model input data, MERGE-I3 now includes recent information on expected econo-
mic growth and energy consumption of the complying regions. In the same spirit, the pow-
er sector options of these regions were restricted for the year 2010 (relative to the REF
scenario) to avoid the possibilities of unrealistically high build-up rates of power plants.
For Japan, we have additionally assumed that no more LNG terminals will be available by
2010 than in the Reference scenario and that therefore natural-gas imports in 2010 must
not exceed those given by the Reference scenario (see also Schrattenholzer and Totschnig
2004).
3 Six Scenarios
To analyze the consequences of assuming different geopolitical scenarios guiding the
emission trading within the Kyoto Protocol, we think that it is useful to think of three
“limiting cases”. One limiting case is a Reference scenario (REF) without GHG emission
1  The scope of MERGE is thus considerably wider than the minimum required for our task. We nevertheless
decided to use MERGE for our research task, mainly for two reasons. First, we think that as a consequence of its
world-wide use, MERGE can be regarded as a kind of “language” that is widely understood. Second, we think
that it is instructive to see short-time results “embedded” in longer-term scenarios, in particular when talking
about climate change.
2  All regions follow the same convention as EIA-USDOE’s International Energy Outlook (2004), with the only
exception that we included the new Baltic EU members Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in EEU (and not in FSU).
3  We use MERGE-I (“I” as in IIASA) to refer the new version of the original model. 
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constraints. GHG abatement costs are calculated relative to this scenario. The second
limiting case is an extreme compliance scenario (DOM) in which the “Kyoto limits” are
achieved exclusively with domestic measures. Relative to this scenario, benefits of GHG
emission trading (including CDM) are calculated. As a third limiting case we defined the
“Full Trade” (FT) scenario in which all Parties participate freely in global GHG emission
trading. In particular, the full potential of CDM is available on the global market.
Note that in all scenarios including GHG trading (i.e. all scenarios in Table 1 but REF and
DOM) it is assumed that sellers of “hot air” cooperate (by limiting the quantities sold)
with each other to achieve their maximum revenues4 in the 2008–2012 period. In this stu-
dy no banking of emission permits between different time periods is considered.
In order to determine the possible role of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) in a
carbon market dominated by the carbon sellers, we defined the scenario “Full Trade, no
CDM” (FTnCDM). A comparison between this scenario and FT (“Full Trade”) quantifies
the benefits of CDM in a global GHG emission market with a sellers’ cartel.
To calculate the effect of an assumed “European GHG Emission Bubble”, the “Divided
Market” (DM) scenario stipulates that – as a consequence of an expanding European Un-
4  Maximum revenues of permit selling were determined by a series of model runs with different limits on the
selling of “hot air”.
Figure 1
CDM Supply Curves as Function of the Carbon Price for three Scenarios of Russian 
Ratification
1 From today until 2012 in Mt CO2 equivalent.
Source: Original curves: Tangen et al. (2004); interpolation by the authors.
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ion – Western Europe and Eastern Europe jointly comply to the total of their respective
Kyoto limits (the “bubble”). The international trade of GHG emission rights is thus left to
Japan and Canada trading with Russia. To give this scenario the flavor of risk analysis
(from the perspective of the non-European Parties to the Kyoto Protocol), Ukraine is as-
sumed not to become eligible to sell on the global GHG emission market. The Clean-De-
velopment Mechanism (CDM) is included. Again the effect of including CDM is analyzed
by formulating a variant of DM, DMnCDM, which is derived from DM by assuming the
non-availability of CDM.
For convenient reference, the definitions of the six scenarios are summarized in Table 1.
Restricting the GHG emissions only for the First Commitment Period of the Kyoto Proto-
col (2008–2012) would be likely to lead to implausible results. For all scenarios (except
REF) we therefore assumed that the GHG emission limits remain at the 2010 levels
throughout the time horizon of the model. This is a commonly used assumption for long-
term energy models and is usually dubbed as “Kyoto Forever”.
3.1 The MERGE Reference Scenario
Before presenting the results of the compliance scenarios, we now give a brief character-
ization of the MERGE Reference scenario (from 2000–2100) as defined by Manne and
Richels (2004).
In the original MERGE, population projections from present up to 2020 are taken from the
International Energy Outlook 2003 (EIA-USDOE, 2003). For the time after 2020, it has
been assumed that the global population grows asymptotically towards 10 billion. The po-
tential economic growth of MERGE’s Reference scenario amounts to an average annual
growth rate (AAGR) of global GDP over the 21st century of 2.4% percent. Again includ-
ing recent information into our version of the model, we set the potential annual GDP
growth in the model’s first time period (2000–2005) to 1% for Japan and to 1.6% for WEU
(down from 1.2% and 2.2% respectively).
We summarize the results of the reference scenario by reporting long-term average annual
growth rates (AAGRs) in Figure 2.
Table 1
Overview of Six Scenario Definitions
Source: This article.
1. REF 2. DOM 3. FT  4. FTnCDM 5. DM 6. DMnCDM
Business as usual, 
no policy
Domestic actions 
only
Full trade, with 
CDM and sellers 
cartel
Full trade, sellers 
cartel, no CDM
Divided market, 
with CDM, no 
Ukraine, EU bubble, 
Japan and Canada 
emission trade with 
Russia
Divided market, no 
CDM, no Ukraine, 
EU bubble, Japan 
and Canada 
emission trade with 
Russia
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One way of characterizing the main features of these results from an energy and environ-
mental perspective would be so say that the energy intensity of GDP decreases at an aver-
age annual rate of just over 1% while the GHG intensity of energy decreases at an average
annual rate of 0.23%.
3.2 The “Domestic Measures Only” (DOM) Scenario
The purpose of the DOM scenario was to measure the maximum cost of compliance. A
comparison between DOM and a scenario including GHG emission trading permits the
calculation of the effects of emissions trading as defined in the according scenario.
In addition to showing the cost of GHG emission reduction to the “Kyoto target”, we show
in Figure 3 GDP loss also for different reduction targets to more fully characterize the re-
lation between reduction levels and cost.
The GDP losses resulting from complying with the Kyoto targets with domestic measures
only are 1.75% for Canada, 0.31% for Japan and 0.23% for WEU. The most important
reason explaining this difference between the abatement cost curves of these three regions
is that in the Reference scenario, the GHG emissions in 2010 of Canada, Japan and WEU
increase by 35%, 21% and 3% from their respective 1990 values. As a result, Canada’s
Kyoto limit is the most stringent and its GDP loss is highest. Japan’s GHG emissions in
the Reference are also high, but its GDP loss is mitigated considerably by the compara-
tively high allowances for sequestration from forest management as decided at COP-6 in
Bonn. The low GHG emission growth of 3% in WEU and the accordingly low marginal
abatement costs (see also Table 2) are not surprising given the restructuring of Germany’s
economy following German unification.
Figure 2
Long-term Annually Averaged Growth Rates (AAGR) of the World GDP, Population, GHG 
Emission and Energy Consumption, MERGE Reference Scenario 
Source: Manne and Richels (2004).
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Analyzing the results in more detail shows that the reduction of the GHG intensity of the
energy system via fuel switching (decarbonization), energy demand reduction, and abate-
ment plus sequestration (forest management and non-CO2 GHG abatement measures)
contribute approximately 30 percent each to the total abatement of GHG emissions in all
three regions. “Leakage” (GHG reductions by importing energy-intensive products in-
stead of producing them domestically) contributes 6% (WEU), 11% (Canada) and 16%
(Japan) respectively. In all three regions energy demand reductions limit the use of coal
for power generation and that of oil in the non-electric sector. As a consequence of the
limited speed of change, renewable energy sources play a minor role in 2010.
3.3 The “Full Trade” (FT) Scenario
The “Full Trade” (FT) scenario assumes a global market of GHG emission permits and a
full availability of emission reduction according to CDM. In this sense, FT combines eco-
nomic and environmental efficiency. Recall that for this scenario, it is assumed that Ea-
stern Europe, Russia and Ukraine form a sellers’ cartel and that all three choose to sell the
same fraction of their assigned GHG emission permits (Assigned Amount Units, AAU) in
order to maximize their revenues. This maximization is summarized in Figure 4.
The revenue curves for EEU, Russia and Ukraine are more or less flat for permit export
limits between 5% and 15% and have three gentle but noticeable peaks. We chose the
middle value of 10% (of the AAUs) for the main variant of the “Full Trade” scenario (and
Figure 3
GDP Loss as a Function of the Reduction Target (Relative to 1990 Emissions) for the 
“Domestic Measures only” Scenario
Scenario for Canada, Japan, and WEU; MERGE-I Runs.
The vertical black lines indicate the Kyoto targets.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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for the summary in Table 2). Selling 10% of AAUs corresponds to selling about 41% of
the Russian plus Ukrainian and 60% of the EEU “hot air”.5
At the chosen point, also the curve of total expenditures of the permit importers for per-
mits is already in its flat part (see Figure 5).
3.4 The “Full Trade, no CDM” (FTnCDM) Scenario
The “Full Trade, but no CDM” (FTnCDM) scenario is identical to FT with the exception
that here, no CDM is allowed. In Figure 6 we again show the permit sellers’ revenues as a
function of the amount of sold permits.
The optimal permit export limit with the highest revenues for the sellers was to sell only
6.6% of their Assigned Amount Units (AAU), which corresponds to selling about 27% of
the Russian plus Ukrainian and 39% of the EEU “hot air”.
Looking at the impact of different permit export limits from the buyers’ perspective, we
show, in Figure 7, the costs of permit purchase.
5  The total “hot air” of EEU and FSU (Russia+Ukraine) amount to about 17% and 25% of their respective
Assigned Amount Units (AAUs).
Figure 4
Russian plus Ukrainian and EEU Revenues from Selling Different Amounts of GHG 
Emission Permits and Marginal Abatement Costs (MAC) in Canada, Japan, and WEU, 
MERGE-I run “Full Trade” Scenario
The marginal abatement costs (MAC) is an important driver for the carbon price.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Figure 6
Russian plus Ukrainian and EEU Revenues from Selling Different Amounts of GHG 
Emission Permits and Marginal Abatement Costs, (MAC) in Canada, Japan, and WEU, “Full 
Trade, no CDM” Scenario
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Figure 5
Total Costs for Permit (“hot air” and CDM) Purchasing of Canada, Japan, and WEU at 
Different Amounts of Sold Permits, “Full Trade” Scenario
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Figure 6 and Figure 7 show that without the CDM option the sellers’ revenues and the
buyers’ expenditures strongly depend on the sellers’ cartel limitations of the permit ex-
ports. The carbon price goes to zero as soon as the exporting regions (Former Soviet Un-
ion and Eastern Europe) export more carbon emission entitlements than needed for the
compliance of all Parties (18% of their Assigned Amount Units or 81% of EEU+Rus-
sian+Ukrainian “hot air”). Note however, that this result rests on the assumed annual GDP
growth rates (between 2000 and 2010) of 4.5% for Russia, Ukraine and 4% for EEU. In
contrast, at lower values of the permit export limit, the carbon price becomes so high that
it is optimal for WEU (the region with the lowest MAC in DOM) to even sell some of its
permits and to increase domestic mitigation and that Canada and Japan also increasingly
comply by domestic measures. This limits total revenues of the sellers. The GDP losses
for the most profitable permit export limit of 6.6% are 0.79% for Canada, 0.19% for Japan
and 0.20% for WEU.
3.5 The “Divided Market” (DM) Scenario
The non-European Parties of the Kyoto Protocol (and European environmentalists) are
concerned about the possibility that WEU and EEU jointly comply with their Kyoto tar-
gets (“European bubble”). As CDM is included in this scenario, Canada, Europe, and Jap-
an compete for CDM, while Canada and Japan compete for “hot air” from Russia. To
make this scenario a “risk analysis” case, Ukraine is assumed to be not eligible for carbon
trading.
The determination of Russia’s optimal permit export limit is illustrated in Figure 8. The
figure clearly shows that Europe is “decoupled” from the effects of Russia varying her
Figure 7
Total Expenditures for Permit Purchases by Canada, Japan, and WEU at Different 
Amounts of Sold Permits, “Full Trade, but no CDM” Scenario
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Figure 8
Russian Revenues from Selling Different Amounts of GHG Emission Permits and Marginal 
Abatement Costs, (MAC) in Canada, Japan, and WEU, “Divided Market” Scenario
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Figure 9
Total Costs for Permit (“hot air” and CDM) Purchasing of Canada, Japan, and WEU at 
Different Amounts of Sold Permits, “Divided Market” ScenarioI
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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permit export limit. Similar to the “Full Trade” scenario, marginal GHG abatement costs
of Canada and Japan approach zero when Russia’s export limits approach 17% of her
AAUs (equivalent to 69% of the Russian “hot air”). The revenues curve is flat near 10%,
and this is the value chosen for the main variant of the DM scenario (and for the summary
in Table 2). Selling 10% of AAUs corresponds to selling about 41% of the Russian “hot
air”.
From the buyers’ perspective, the influence of varying Russia’s permit export limit looks
as shown in Figure 9. The costs of permit purchase increases for WEU for a permit export
limit more than 15%, since WEU then buys CDM credits (which are offered at lower
prices at a consequence of Russia’s lower “hot air” prices, which make Canada and Japan
buy more “hot air”) in addition to the EEU “hot air” and spares by this expensive domestic
mitigation measures.
The share of CDM in total permit purchase strongly depends on the prevailing carbon
price. It decreases from a 37% share at a permit export limit of 3.3% to a 6% share when
the permit export limit is set at 15% of Russia’s AAUs.
From Figure 10 it can be seen that Russian “hot air” competes with CDM for market
shares of emission credits bought by Canada and Japan. The resulting Russian revenues,
as seen in Figure 8, are rather stable between selling 6.6% and 15% of their AAUs, due to
the declining carbon price.
Figure 10
Amounts of Hot Air Sold by Russia to Canada and Japan, Amounts of Certified Emission 
Reduction Credits (CERs) from CDM Projects Purchased by the WEU, Canada, and Japan on 
the other Side, “Divided Market” Scenario
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Figure 11
Russian and EEU Revenues from Selling Different Amounts of GHG Emission Permits and 
Marginal Abatement Costs, (MAC) in Canada, Japan, and WEU, “Divided Market, no CDM” 
Scenario 
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Figure 12
Total Costs for Permit Purchasing of Canada, Japan, and WEU at Different Amounts of Sold 
Permits, “Divided Market, no CDM” ScenarioI
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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3.6 The “Divided Market, no CDM” (DMnCDM) Scenario
This scenario analyzes the effect of CDM in the “Divided Market” scenario by excluding
the CDM option. Maximizing Russia’s trading revenues from permit sales is illustrated in
Figure 11.
An analysis of the results further shows that purchasing “hot air” amounts to 29% of Ca-
nada’s, 10% of Japan’s and 64% of WEU’s reductions to comply the Kyoto Protocol. Be-
cause of WEU’s unlimited access to EEU’s “hot air” assumed for this scenario, WEU even
exports more energy-intensive goods for the global market than in the Reference scenario.
4 Comparative Presentation of the Results and Conclusions
In the previous section, we have characterized the scenarios mainly in their own terms.
Now we want to compare all scenarios in one place (Table 2). The table not only permits
to evaluate the benefits of carbon trade and the relative value of carbon trading schemes,
but also indicates economic costs and environmental benefits of each scenario.
As described before, in all trading scenarios (scenarios 3–6) it is assumed that exporters of
emission rights form a cartel to maximize their revenues from permit selling by limiting
the “hot air” exports. The “hot air” export limit which yields optimal revenues for the ex-
porters is given in Table 2 in the third column as fraction of the exporters’ Assigned
Amount Units (AAU).
The fourth column of the table gives the global GHG emission reductions in 2010 com-
pared to the Reference scenario. For interpreting the global GHG emission reduction (Fig-
ure 13) one has to take into account that in the in the MERGE Reference scenario, global
GHG emissions increase by 28% between 1990 and 2010. A reduction of 2% compared to
REF in 2010 therefore means a 26% increase compared to 1990.
In this summary of compliance cost, a number observations stand out. One is that trade
can reduce the GDP losses of Canada, Japan, and Western Europe significantly to frac-
tions of one percent. In all compliance scenarios, Canada has the highest compliance cost
of all MERGE-I regions that observe GHG emission limits. In terms of GDP lost, Cana-
da’s costs range from 0.15% in the most favorable scenario to 1.75% in the “Domestic
Measures Only” scenario. For comparison, the according ranges for Japan and WEUR are
0.04 to 0.31 and 0.05 to 0.23% respectively. At the same time, this summary also shows
that GDP losses in all scenarios remain relatively small. Relative to projected GDP
growth, a 1% loss for instance, would mean the loss of less than one year’s growth or, in
other words, the “postponement of growth” by less than one year.
Most of the past studies of compliance costs did not consider the possible monopolistic
behaviour of the dominant permit seller Russia. Here, we investigate the combined effects
of a possible monopolistic permit selling cartel and a CDM supply that reacts to carbon
prices. In this case, a functioning CDM scheme considerably lowers the carbon price. This
is not only a result of the additionally available CDM permits, but also a result of the “hot
air” sellers’ cartel competing for market shares with CDM and thereby possibly increasing
the amount of hot air sold. A further result is that in the absence of CDM, the permit seller
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revenues show a narrow maximum around selling 6.6% of the AAUs. In contrast, if CDM
is available, then permit seller revenues are almost constant for a broad range of permit ex-
ports (from approximately 5% to 15%). Similarly, the compliance costs for Canada, Japan
and WEU depend rather weakly on the “hot air” supply if CDM is available, where as the
costs vary strongly with the available “hot air” in the absence of CDM. The results show
that the differences between compliance costs for Canada, Japan and WEU between the
“Full Trade” scenario and the “Divided Market” scenario are only marginal when CDM is
available. In the absence of CDM, European compliance costs in the “Divided Market”
scenario are cut approximately to one-half compared to the “Full Trade” scenario without
CDM. The costs of Japan and Canada in the “Divided Market” scenario without CDM are
similar as in the “Full Trade” scenario, but much higher than the costs of WEU. Ukraine
not selling emissions permits would increase Canada’s and Japan’s compliance cost by ap-
proximately 25% in the “Divided Market” scenario.
In this paper we assume that a sellers’ cartel optimizes revenues from permit selling, but
Russia may also follow other considerations. Holtsmark, e.g., argues that Russian oil and
gas interests are likely to boost Russia’s inclination to sell permits, ultimately resulting in
lower permit prices (Holtsmark 2003). We regard the effect of the Kyoto Protocol on the
oil prices to be negligible, since the oil price is more influenced by political decisions and
demand growth than by the small fraction of sectors subject to the Kyoto Protocol.
Switching to natural gas to reduce GHG emissions would be even profitable for Russia. In
addition, as is argued by Moe and Tangen (2000), the Russian government could be
inclined to restrict “hot air” sales in order to stimulate Joint Implementation (JI) projects,
enabling valuable technology transfers. So we think the sellers’ cartel assumption
reasonably justified.
An overview of the compliance costs and the GHG emission reductions is given in
Figure 13.
Figure 13
Compliance Costs in Five Scenarios Given as GDP Loss 
1 In percent of Reference scenario GDP.
2 The global GHG emission reductions in 2010 are given in percent of the Reference scenario emissions in 2010.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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From the figure it can be seen that the GHG emission reductions for all trading regimes
are similar: approximately 60% of the DOM scenario. But comparing the achieved GHG
emission reductions with the GDP losses of each scenario makes it clear that the “Full
Trade” and “Divided Market” scenarios with CDM achieve this emission reduction at
much lower GDP losses.
In conclusion, we present a comparison between our results and those obtained in other
studies. We summarize compliance costs obtained by other authors analyzing abatement
costs in the presence of a sellers’ cartel with our results in Table 3. This table taken from
Springer (2003) was amended with our own calculations.
Results of studies assuming a cartel of only Russia and Ukraine differ from the “Divided
Market” scenario, since in these models the EEU is a price taker but with only one global
carbon price, where as the “Divided Market” scenario has a separate carbon market in the
Europe with a substantially lower carbon price.
Table 3
Comparison Results by other Authors with Results Obtained
by this Study
Sinks: Bonn (B), Marrakesh (M)
Sources: 4Blanchard et al. (2002), 2Böhringer (2002), 7Babiker et al. (2002), 5den Elzen and de Morr (2002), 
1Eyckmans et al. (2001), 6Jakeman et al. (2001), 3,8Löschl and Zhang (2002).
Model
MAC
  (2000 US$/tCO2)
Share of "Hot Air" 
sold (%)
Sinks
Cartel RUS+UKR+EEU:
MACGEM1 22 17 None
PACE2 17 40 B
POLES 3 19 36 B,M
POLES&ASPEN 4 5 10 B,M
WORLDSCAN 5 5 60 B,M
Cartel RUS+UKR:
GTEM 6 12 55 B
MIT-EPPA 7 7 50 B,M
POLES 8 11 34 B,M
This Study:
FT 4 44 B,M
FT n CDM 26 29 B,M
DM
 3 (WEU) ,
4 (Jap., Can.) 
53 B,M
DM n CDM
 3 (WEU) ,
34 (Jap. Can.)
35 B,M
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